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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Due to the rising number of asbestos-related personal 
injury lawsuits filed in the 1980s, a group of producers of 
asbestos and asbestos-containing products (“Members” or 
“Participating Producers”) joined together and formed the 
Center for Claims Resolution (the “Center”) to administer 
asbestos personal injury claims on behalf of the Members.  
The Members negotiated and signed the Producer Agreement 
Concerning Center for Claims Resolution (the “Producer 
Agreement”), which established and set forth the mechanics 
of the Center and the obligations of the Members.  Appellants 
United States Gypsum Company (“U.S. Gypsum”) and 
Quigley Company, Inc. (“Quigley”) and the predecessor-in-
interest of Appellee G-I Holdings, Inc. (“G-I”) were among 
the roughly twenty asbestos producers who signed the 
Producer Agreement, thereby becoming Members of the 
Center. 
 After G-I failed to pay its contractually-calculated 
share due to pay out personal injury settlements and cover 
Center expenses, U.S. Gypsum and Quigley were obligated to 
pay additional sums to cover G-I’s payment obligations.  G-I 
filed for bankruptcy and the Center, U.S. Gypsum, and 
Quigley each filed a proof of claim in the Bankruptcy Court 
seeking to recover for G-I’s nonpayment under the Producer 
Agreement.  The Center eventually settled its claim with G-I.   
 Although arising in the context of a bankruptcy 
proceeding, this case concerns claims for breach of contract 
under Delaware law.  We are asked to decide whether, under 
the Producer Agreement, U.S. Gypsum and Quigley 
(together, the “Former Members”) may maintain a breach of 
contract action against G-I.  We hold that the Producer 
Agreement permits the Former Members to pursue a breach 
of contract action against G-I for its failure to pay 
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contractually-obligated sums due to the Center, in light of the 
Former Members’ payment of G-I’s share.  We therefore 
vacate the District Court’s order affirming the Bankruptcy 
Court’s grant of summary judgment in G-I’s favor. 
I. 
A. 
 Facing a growing number of asbestos-related personal 
injury lawsuits, a group of producers of asbestos and 
asbestos-containing products joined together to form the 
Center in order to more effectively defend against and resolve 
the lawsuits.  The Center was incorporated as a non-profit, 
non-stock Delaware corporation in September 1988 to 
“administer and arrange for the evaluation, settlement, 
payment, and defense of asbestos-related bodily injury 
claims.”  (A-684). 
 The Producer Agreement sets forth the Members’ 
purposes in entering the agreement and establishing the 
Center.  The Members stated that they “believe it is important 
to establish an organization that will, on behalf of all 
Participating Producers, resolve meritorious asbestos-related 
claims in a fair and expeditious manner and, where necessary, 
defend asbestos-related claims efficiently and economically.”  
(A-715).  They also sought to “enter into a constructive 
relationship with one another and to resolve any cross or 
counter claims that they may have against each other.”  (Id.).   
 The Center was governed by a five-person Board of 
Directors.  A producer became a Member of the Center by 
signing the Producer Agreement, and membership could be 
terminated by a Member’s written notice, by a Member’s 
bankruptcy, or by resolution of the Board of Directors.  
However, even after termination of membership, the former 
Member would “continue to have and to honor all of the 
obligations incurred by it [under the Producer Agreement] or 
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on its behalf as a member prior to the effective date of its 
membership termination.”  (A-720). 
 The Producer Agreement designates the Center as each 
Member’s “sole agent to  
administer and arrange on its behalf for the evaluation, 
settlement, payment or defense of all asbestos-related claims 
against such Participating Producer.”  (A-721).  The Producer 
Agreement defines “asbestos-related claims” as “claims or 
lawsuits against any Participating Producers or the Center . . . 
seeking monetary relief . . . for bodily injury, sickness, 
disease or death, alleged to have been caused in whole or in 
part by any asbestos or asbestos-containing product.”  (A-
716).  After settling or otherwise resolving claims on behalf 
of the Members, the Center would bill and collect each 
Member’s allocated share of liability payments and expenses 
based upon a formula set forth in an attachment to the 
Producer Agreement. 
 If a Member failed to pay its share of liability 
payments or expenses in a timely manner, the Producer 
Agreement provides that “the Center’s Board of Directors 
may direct the Center to institute an ADR on behalf of the 
Center’s Participating Producers against such Participating 
Producer to enforce payment of such obligations.”  (A-731-
32).  With respect to claims between Members, the Producer 
Agreement provides that “[s]o long as it is a member of the 
Center each Participating Producer shall forego with respect 
to asbestos-related claims for contribution or indemnity (other 
than for contribution or indemnity assumed under written 
agreement) against all other Participating Producers that are 
members of the Center.”  (A-730-31).   
 Finally, the Producer Agreement sets forth that it is 
“not intended to confer any rights or benefits upon any other 
persons” aside from Members, the Center, and some of the 
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Members’ insurers.  (A-727).  Other than the Center, a 
signatory Member, or a Member’s insurer, “[n]o person . . . 
shall have any legally enforceable rights under the 
Agreement.”  (Id.).  “All rights of action for any breach of 
this Agreement by any signatory hereto are hereby reserved to 
the Center, Participating Producers and to Supporting Insurers 
that are paying unallocated expenses incurred by the Center.”  
(Id.). 
 G-I is the successor-in-interest to GAF Corporation, 
which was named in a large number of asbestos-related 
lawsuits.  G-I’s membership in the Center was terminated by 
the Center’s Board of Directors after the Board determined 
that G-I had breached the Producer Agreement by failing to 
pay its share of settlements and expenses.  G-I’s termination 
was effective January 17, 2000.  Shortly after the termination 
of G-I’s membership, the Center notified G-I that it owed the 
Center almost $300 million and commenced an ADR for 
payment.  The ADR was stayed once G-I filed for bankruptcy 
in January of 2001.  The Center sought additional payments 
from the remaining Members to satisfy G-I’s share of 
settlements and expenses. 
 U.S. Gypsum and Quigley were Members of the 
Center at the same time as G-I. On February 1, 2001, Quigley 
withdrew from the Center, thereby terminating its 
membership.  On June 25, 2001, U.S. Gypsum filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which terminated its membership.  
U.S. Gypsum and Quigley assert that they made payments to 
the Center to cover the shortfall caused by G-I’s failure to 
pay. 
B. 
 G-I filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on January 5, 
2001.  The Bankruptcy Court fixed October 15, 2008 as the 
date by which all proofs of claim against any interest in the 
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debtor had to be filed.  On October 9, 2008, the Center filed a 
proof of claim alleging that G-I was liable to the Center for a 
total of $254.7 million due to its breach of the Producer 
Agreement.
1
  The Center alleged that it paid out $29.5 million 
to asbestos claimants on G-I’s behalf before it stopped paying 
out G-I’s share of the settlements to asbestos claimants.  It 
also asserted that G-I owed it $2.6 million for G-I’s share of 
the Center’s expenses.  Finally, the Center claimed damages 
for settlement agreements that asbestos claimants had voided 
after G-I’s membership terminated.  Although the Center had 
not paid out any of these settlements, it claimed that G-I owed 
it $222.6 million as damages for the settlements that would 
not have been voided but for G-I’s breach.  In its proof of 
claim, the Center did not state whether it had sought 
reimbursement from the remaining Members of the Center for 
the $29.5 million it paid on G-I’s behalf. 
 Both of the Former Members filed a separate proof of 
claim seeking to recover sums paid to the Center to cover G-
                                              
1
 The amount of the Center’s claim as of the date of G-
I’s bankruptcy filing differs from the amount of the claim as 
of the date of filing the proof of claim.  See A-775 (“As of 
January 6, 2001 (the “Petition Date”), the [Center] had a 
claim against G-I Holdings, Inc. (the “Debtor”) in the 
aggregate principal amount of $299,510,764 plus interest and 
attorneys’ fees.  As of the date of the filing of this Proof of 
Claim, the [Center] has a claim against the Debtor in the 
aggregate principal amount of $254,705,373 plus interest, 
fees, and expenses.”).  The Center had sought the $299.5 
million figure from G-I shortly after its membership 
terminated.  We use the $254.7 million figure because that is 
the amount stated as presently owed in the proof of claim that 
G-I and the Center eventually settled. 
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I’s obligations.  U.S. Gypsum filed its proof of claim on 
October 15, 2008, asserting a breach of contract claim.  U.S. 
Gypsum maintained that in November 2000, the Center 
sought reimbursement from the remaining Members of the 
Center, including U.S. Gypsum, for the Center’s payment of 
$30 million to asbestos claimants on G-I’s behalf.  U.S. 
Gypsum paid roughly $6.3 million to the Center to reimburse 
the Center for the payments made on G-I’s behalf.  Quigley 
filed a proof of claim on October 13, 2008 seeking 
unliquidated damages for G-I’s breach of the Producer 
Agreement.  G-I filed objections to the proofs of claim. 
 The Center and G-I settled the Center’s claim against 
G-I seeking $254.7 million for a cash payment of $9.9 
million.  On September 4, 2009, G-I moved for approval of 
the Settlement Agreement in the Bankruptcy Court.  The 
Former Members objected to the settlement and sought 
clarification that the Settlement Agreement would not affect 
or release their claims against G-I.  The Bankruptcy Court 
added language to the Order approving the Settlement 
Agreement, which was entered on September 24, 2009, 
providing that the Settlement Agreement was “binding on all 
entities asserting claims against G-I that derive from [the 
Center] or depend upon [the Center’s] rights.”  (A-476).  
However, “[f]or the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Order 
or the [] Settlement Agreement shall release, prejudice, 
compromise or otherwise affect the claims, if any, that 
Former Members . . . have or may have against the G-I Plan 
Parties . . . .”  (Id.). 
 The District Court and Bankruptcy Court approved G-
I’s Eighth Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization on 
November 12, 2009.  In the Eighth Amended Plan, G-I 
maintained that the Former Members’ claims were derivative 
of the Center’s settled claim, and should therefore be 
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considered settled.  But the Plan set forth that to the extent 
that the Former Members’ claims would be allowed, they 
would receive cash equal to 8.6% of the allowed claim 
amount.   
 G-I filed for summary judgment on the Former 
Members’ claims on July 15, 2010.  After briefing, the 
Bankruptcy Court issued an opinion on August 13, 2012 
granting the motion for summary judgment in G-I’s favor.  
The Bankruptcy Court concluded that the Center was 
authorized to resolve G-I’s breach by nonpayment, and the 
Producer Agreement barred the Former Members from 
pursuing claims, including for breach of contract, against G-I.  
The Bankruptcy Court also determined that the Former 
Members’ claims were derivative of the Center’s claim, 
which provided an additional reason that Former Members 
could not maintain their claims against G-I.  
 U.S. Gypsum and Quigley appealed to the District 
Court, which affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision on 
June 26, 2013.  The District Court agreed with the 
Bankruptcy Court that the Former Members were 
contractually barred from pursuing an independent breach of 
contract action against G-I, reasoning that the Producer 
Agreement sought to avoid all litigation between Members.  
The District Court explained that, when read in the context of 
Section X’s title (“Third-Party Rights”) and the rest of the 
Producer Agreement, language reserving rights of action for 
breach to the Members did not create a right to bring breach 
of contract claims.  It also concluded that the section 
permitting the Center to bring an ADR for a Member’s failure 
to pay did not “leav[e] open the option for independent 
members to bypass the sole authority of the [Center] to 
remedy [the breach] on their own.”  (A-7).  The District Court 
did not reach the issue of whether the Former Members’ 
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claims were direct or derivative.  U.S. Gypsum and Quigley 
both filed a timely notice of appeal. 
II. 
 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction over this core 
matter in G-I’s bankruptcy proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1334(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 157.  The Former Members timely 
appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s final order to the District 
Court, which exercised its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(1) and Bankruptcy Rule 8001(a).  We have 
jurisdiction to review the District Court’s final order under 28 
U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 “We review a district court’s grant of summary 
judgment de novo, applying the same standard the district 
court applied.”  Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 407, 
413 (3d Cir. 2011).  “We also review the legal interpretation 
of contractual language de novo.”  Id.   
 Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a).  “An issue is genuine only if there is a sufficient 
evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for 
the non-moving party, and a factual dispute is material only if 
it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.”  
Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 
(1986)).  In conducting our review, we view the record in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all 
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.  Bowers v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 535 (3d Cir. 2007).  
A motion for summary judgment is properly denied if “a fair-
minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the 
evidence presented.”  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. 
III. 
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 The Former Members argue that the District Court 
erred in holding that the Producer Agreement bars them from 
pursuing a breach of contract claim against G-I.  They also 
urge us not to adopt the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusions that 
the Former Members’ claims are derivative of the Center’s 
claim and that allowing Former Members’ claims would lead 
to a double recovery.  We will address each issue in turn. 
A. 
 In determining whether the Former Members may 
maintain a breach of contract action against G-I under the 
Producer Agreement, we must heed the guidance of the 
Delaware courts
2
 and “give priority to the parties’ intentions 
as reflected in the four corners of the agreement.”  GMG 
Capital Invs., LLC v. Athenian Venture Partners I, L.P., 36 
A.3d 776, 779 (Del. 2012).  “In upholding the intentions of 
the parties, a court must construe the agreement as a whole, 
giving effect to all provisions therein.”  E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 498 A.2d 1108, 1113 
(Del. 1985).  A court should interpret the contract “in such a 
way as to not render any of its provisions illusory or 
meaningless.”  Sonitrol Holding Co. v. Marceau 
Investissements, 607 A.2d 1177, 1183 (Del. 1992).  “[C]lear 
and unambiguous terms” in a contract are interpreted 
according to their ordinary meaning.  GMG Capital Invs., 36 
A.3d at 780.  However, “the meaning which arises from a 
particular portion of an agreement cannot control the meaning 
of the entire agreement where such inference runs counter to 
the agreement’s overall scheme or plan.”  E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours, 498 A.2d at 1113. 
                                              
2
 The parties agree that the law of the state of 
Delaware governs the Producer Agreement.  
 13 
 We also must keep in mind the elements that a plaintiff 
must prove for breach of contract.  For a successful breach of 
contract claim, a party must prove:  “1) a contractual 
obligation; 2) a breach of that obligation by the defendant; 
and 3) a resulting damage to the plaintiff.”  H-M Wexford 
LLC v. Encorp, Inc., 832 A.2d 129, 140 (Del. Ch. 2003).   
 With these principles in mind, we turn to the terms of 
the Producer Agreement.  We will first address the language 
that is most relevant to Former Members’ ability to sue G-I 
for its breach by nonpayment, which is found in Section X.  
We will then address whether allowing Former Members to 
bring a breach of contract action under Section X is consistent 
with the purpose of the Producer Agreement and with its 
other provisions and overall scheme. 
 The third sentence of Section X provides:  “All rights 
of action for any breach of this Agreement by any signatory 
hereto are hereby reserved to the Center, Participating 
Producers and to Supporting Insurers . . . .”  (A-727).  G-I and 
Former Members were signatories to the Agreement and 
Participating Producers at the time of G-I’s alleged breach.  
For the purposes of this appeal, we will assume that G-I did 
breach the Producer Agreement by failing to make required 
payments.
3
  If this case involved only G-I’s nonpayment of its 
                                              
3
 The District Court ruled on summary judgment that 
the Agreement barred Former Members from bringing a 
breach of contract action against G-I as a matter of law.  It did 
not reach the merits of the breach of contract claim – i.e. 
whether G-I failed to make required payments and thereby 
breached the Producer Agreement.  G-I disputes the breach; 
however, as Former Members are the non-moving parties, we 
will construe the facts in their favor and assume G-I’s breach 
through nonpayment. 
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obligations to the Center, the Former Members would be 
unable to maintain a breach of contract action against G-I 
because they would not yet have suffered damages.  But once 
the Former Members were required to make additional 
payments to cover the shortfall caused by G-I’s nonpayment, 
they suffered damages and accrued a cause of action for 
breach of contract.  Section X reserves the right of the Former 
Members – Participating Producers at the time of G-I’s 
breach – to maintain an action for breach of the Producer 
Agreement against G-I – a signatory. 
 Section X makes explicit a basic contract law 
principle.  “It is axiomatic that either party to an agreement 
may enforce its terms for breach thereof.”  Triple C Railcar 
Serv., Inc. v. City of Wilmington, 630 A.2d 629, 633 (Del. 
1993) (citing Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts,  § 1:1 
(4th ed. 1990)).  Section X expands the universe of entities 
that may bring a breach of contract action under the Producer 
Agreement beyond the Members (who were the only 
signatories to the Producer Agreement) to include the Center 
and some of the Members’ insurers.  It was not necessary for 
the Producer Agreement to acknowledge the Members’ 
ability to sue for breach because such an ability is inherent in 
contract law.  But because the Producer Agreement does 
clearly provide for such a suit, we should not lightly overlook 
Section X as it is the most relevant provision to the issue at 
hand.       
 G-I argues – and both the Bankruptcy and District 
Courts agreed – that this language merely limits third party 
rights under the Producer Agreement.  Section X is titled 
“Third-Party Rights.”  But we will not discount the plain 
language of the third sentence of that section merely because 
of the title.  A court “may examine the [contract] heading ‘as 
additional evidence tending to support the contract’s 
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substantive provisions.’”  Fulkerson v. MHC Operating Ltd., 
01C-07-020, 2002 WL 32067510, at *5 (Del Super. Ct. Sept. 
24, 2002) (emphasis added) (quoting Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. 
v. Cantor, 724 A.2d 571, 582 n.35 (Del. Ch. 1998)).  The title 
of a section cannot contradict or rewrite the plain language of 
the contractual provisions within that section.  “Contract 
headings do not constitute controlling evidence of a contract’s 
substantive meaning.”  Id.     
 G-I also relies upon the other provisions in Section X 
to write off the third sentence.  The first two sentences of 
Section X make it clear that the Producer Agreement does not 
confer rights or benefits upon third parties, and that the only 
entities with legally enforceable rights under the Agreement 
are the Center, signatories to the Producer Agreement, and 
certain insurers. G-I would read the third sentence to merely 
reiterate what the first two already make express – that 
unnamed parties are prevented from enforcing the contract.
 4
  
But this reading would drain the third sentence of meaning 
and would “render a provision or term” – i.e., the language 
reserving rights of action for breach of contract – 
“meaningless or illusory.”  Osborn ex rel. Osborn v. Kemp, 
991 A.2d 1153, 1159 (Del. 2010) (internal quotation marks 
                                              
4
 G-I also takes a different tack by arguing that even if 
the third sentence can be read as allowing Participating 
Producers to bring breach of contract actions, it need not be 
read to allow actions for nonpayment, and instead should be 
read as reserving the right to remedy breaches other than for 
nonpayment.  But this runs counter to the plain language of 
the provision, which specifically reserves “all” rights to bring 
actions for “any” breach of the Agreement.  (A-727).  These 
words imply that actions for breach due to nonpayment are 
included. 
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omitted).  This would violate the rule of contract 
interpretation that we must “give each provision and term 
effect, so as not to render any part of the contract mere 
surplusage.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Kuhn Constr., Inc. v. Diamond State Port Corp., 990 A.2d 
393, 396-97 (Del. 2010)).  We therefore decline G-I’s 
invitation to read the third sentence of Section X as a 
reiteration of or further clarification on the preclusion of third 
party rights under the Producer Agreement.  Unless the 
language of Section X regarding breach of contract actions is 
irreconcilably inconsistent with the Producer Agreement’s 
purpose, other provisions, or overall contractual scheme, we 
should give effect to the “clear and unambiguous” language 
reserving the Former Members’ right to bring a breach of 
contract action against G-I.  GMG Capital Invs., 36 A.3d at 
780.  
 We believe that the plain language of Section X is 
perfectly consistent with the overall purpose of the Producer 
Agreement.  We consider the purpose of the Producer 
Agreement because we must “give priority to the parties’ 
intentions,” id. at 779, and because we do not allow the 
meaning of a particular provision in an agreement to control 
the meaning of the agreement as a whole where that meaning 
“runs counter to the agreement’s overall scheme or plan.”  
E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 498 A.2d at 1113. 
 The introductory statements to the Producer 
Agreement set forth its purposes.  One statement provides 
that the Members “desire to enter into a constructive 
relationship with one another and to resolve any cross or 
counter claims that they may have against each other.”  (A-
715).  The courts below relied in part upon this statement in 
concluding that the purpose of the Producer Agreement was 
to prevent “internecine” litigation – i.e. all litigation 
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occurring between Members.  (A-5, A-51).  This goes too far 
and assumes intent to avoid a lawsuit such as this one where 
no such intent was expressed.  The Producer Agreement 
states that the Members sought to resolve cross and 
counterclaims that they might have against one another.  
Cross and counterclaims refer to claims that Members could 
have against one another in the thousands of asbestos-related 
personal injury lawsuits that were the main concern of the 
Producer Agreement.  The words crossclaim and 
counterclaim presume the existence of an underlying claim 
already being litigated.  See Black’s Law Dict. 433 (9th ed. 
2009) (defining crossclaim as “[a] claim asserted between 
codefendants or coplaintiffs in a case and that relates to the 
subject of the original claim or counterclaim”); Black’s Law 
Dict. 402 (9th ed. 2009) (defining counterclaim as “[a] claim 
for relief asserted against an opposing party after an original 
claim has been made”).  If the Members sought to avoid all 
litigation – as the courts below concluded – they could have 
drafted the Producer Agreement to provide that they sought to 
resolve any claims that they might have against each other, 
instead of any cross or counterclaims.  “[C]ourts should be 
most chary about implying a contractual protection when the 
contract could easily have been drafted to expressly provide 
for it.”  Allied Capital Corp. v. GC-Sun Holdings, L.P., 910 
A.2d 1020, 1035 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
 Unlike the courts below, we cannot say that allowing 
Former Members to pursue a breach of contract action against 
G-I for its nonpayment is inconsistent with the overall 
purpose of the Producer Agreement.  The Producer 
Agreement sought to avoid litigation over the allocation of 
liability in the thousands of asbestos-related personal injury 
suits that inspired the creation of the Center in the first place.  
The desire to resolve these cross and counterclaims says 
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nothing about the type of claim here – a claim among 
Members for breach of contract, unrelated to any individual 
asbestos-related claim.  The expansive reading of purpose 
endorsed by the courts below – preventing internecine 
litigation – colored their analysis of the entire Producer 
Agreement, leading them to conclude that the Former 
Members’ suit against G-I was barred.  We will not adopt 
such a broad interpretation and instead conclude that the 
Former Members’ right to bring a breach of contract action is 
consistent with the purpose of the Producer Agreement. 
 We turn now to consider whether allowing the Former 
Members to sue G-I for its breach under Section X is 
consistent with the other provisions of the Producer 
Agreement.  “In upholding the intentions of the parties, a 
court must construe the agreement as a whole, giving effect to 
all provisions therein.”  E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 498 A.2d at 
1113.  If a meaning that arises from one portion of the 
agreement conflicts with the agreement’s “overall scheme or 
plan,” it cannot control.  Id.  In interpreting the entire 
agreement, “[s]pecific language in a contract controls over 
general language, and where specific and general provisions 
conflict, the specific provision ordinarily qualifies the 
meaning of the general one.”  DCV Holdings, Inc. v. 
ConAgra, Inc., 889 A.2d 954, 961 (Del. 2005).  Section X is a 
general provision, broadly setting forth the right to bring a 
breach of contract action.  If this provision conflicts with a 
more specific provision elsewhere in the Producer Agreement 
or with its overall scheme or plan, we should not allow 
Section X to control. 
 We turn first to Section IV’s designation of the Center 
as the Members’ “sole agent.”  By signing the agreement, 
“each Participating Producer hereby designates the Center as 
its sole agent to administer and arrange on its behalf for the 
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evaluation, settlement, payment or defense of all asbestos-
related claims against such Participating Producer.”  (A-720-
21).  This provision does not conflict with Former Members’ 
ability to bring a breach of contract claim against G-I, 
because the Center’s role as “sole agent” applies only to 
“asbestos-related claims.”  “Asbestos-related claims” are 
specifically defined in the Producer Agreement as lawsuits 
against Participating Producers or the Center “seeking 
monetary relief . . . for bodily injury, sickness, disease or 
death, alleged to have been caused in whole or in part by any 
asbestos or asbestos-containing product.”  (A-716).  The 
Former Members’ claims are breach of contract claims made 
by one party to an agreement against another party seeking 
remuneration for the breaching party’s failure to pay its 
contractually-allocated share of payments to settle asbestos-
related claims.  Their claims are not themselves “asbestos-
related claims.”  Allowing the Former Members to sue G-I for 
its nonpayment does not interfere with the Center’s role as 
“sole agent” for the purposes of administering and settling 
these asbestos personal injury claims.   
 Next we turn to the first paragraph of Section XIV 
(“Section XIV.1”), which provides that during its 
membership, “each Participating Producer shall forego with 
respect to asbestos-related claims for contribution or 
indemnity (other than for contribution or indemnity assumed 
under written agreement) against all other Participating 
Producers that are members of the Center.”  (A-730-31).  
Like the “sole agent” provision in Section IV discussed 
above, because Section XIV.1 qualifies its application to 
“asbestos-related claims” only, it does not conflict with 
Section X.  In limiting suits for contribution and indemnity in 
asbestos personal injury lawsuits, this provision implements 
the Producer Agreement’s stated purpose of resolving cross 
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and counterclaims among the Members.  Asbestos-related 
claims for contribution or indemnity seek to reapportion 
damages based upon each tortfeasor’s proportionate share of 
liability in the underlying personal injury lawsuits.  See e.g., 
Black’s Law Dict. 378 (9th ed. 2009) (defining contribution 
as “[o]ne tortfeasor’s right to collect from joint tortfeasors 
when – and to the extent that – the tortfeasor has paid more 
than his or her proportionate share to the injured party, the 
shares being determined as percentages of causal fault”).  The 
Former Members’ breach of contract actions seek to recover a 
set amount of money that they paid to cover G-I’s obligation 
as calculated under a contractual formula.  These claims are 
not based upon G-I’s share of the “fault” in the asbestos 
personal injury actions; rather, they are based upon the 
Producer Agreement.  We cannot read Section XIV.1, which 
limits suits for contribution and indemnity for asbestos-
related claims, as being in conflict with the Former Members’ 
ability to bring suit for breach of the Producer Agreement 
under Section X. 
 Finally, we turn to the fourth paragraph of Section 
XIV (“Section XIV.4”), which addresses a Member’s 
nonpayment.  This section provides:  “In the event that any 
Participating Producer’s percentage shares of liability 
payments or allocated expenses are not paid in a timely 
manner, the Center’s Board of Directors may direct the 
Center to institute an ADR on behalf of the Center’s 
Participating Producers against such Participating Producer to 
enforce payment of such obligations.”  (A-731-32).  Allowing 
Former Members to maintain their breach of contract actions 
against G-I does not conflict with this provision for several 
reasons.  Most notably, Section XIV.4 provides that in the 
event of nonpayment, the Center’s Board may direct the 
Center to institute an ADR.  This language is permissive, not 
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mandatory or exclusive.  Language in Section IV clearly 
articulates the Center’s “exclusive authority” and role as the 
Members’ “sole agent” in administering asbestos-related 
claims brought against Members.  The drafting parties 
therefore knew how to draft a provision giving the Center 
“sole” or “exclusive” authority.  In concluding that the Center 
had the exclusive right to bring an action for G-I’s 
nonpayment, the courts below changed “may” into 
“exclusively has the authority to.”  We will not read 
“exclusive authority” into the contract “when the contract 
could easily have been drafted to expressly provide for it.”  
Allied Capital Corp., 910 A.2d at 1035.    
 Consideration of the third element of a breach of 
contract claim – damages – is the key to understanding why 
the Former Members’ right to pursue a breach of contract 
action is consistent with Section XIV.4.  The Former 
Members suffered damages once they were required to make 
additional payments to cover the shortfall caused by G-I’s 
breach.  Before the Former Members were required to cover 
the shortfall, the harm G-I caused fell upon the Center, as the 
Center was unable to collect payments and therefore fulfill its 
settlement obligations to asbestos plaintiffs.  In such a 
situation, the Center would rely upon Section XIV.4 to 
enforce the nonpaying Member’s obligations.  But once the 
other Members paid G-I’s share, the harm to the Center was 
remedied – the Center fulfilled its obligations to asbestos 
plaintiffs – and became a harm to the Members who paid 
more than their share due under the Producer Agreement.  
Sections X and XIV.4 are particularly consistent with one 
another when viewed in light of the timing considerations 
outlined above.  Section XIV.4 allows the Center to “enforce 
payment” before the Center has required others to cover the 
breaching signatory’s share, when the Center is responsible 
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for the money due to asbestos plaintiffs.  Section X allows 
Members to bring a breach of contract action after the Center 
has required them to cover and pay the breaching signatory’s 
share, when the Center has fulfilled its obligations to asbestos 
plaintiffs and the damage caused by the breach has shifted 
onto those Members.
5
 
                                              
5
 If the Center were to bring and carry through to 
judgment an ADR on behalf of all Members harmed by one 
Member’s breach, it is possible that Section XIV.4 would 
foreclose those Members’ ability to sue under Section X even 
if the non-breaching Members had covered and paid the 
breaching Member’s share.  Under these circumstances, the 
Center would have recovered on behalf of all Members who 
covered and paid, and their right to recovery would be 
foreclosed as their injury would have been remedied by the 
Center, acting on their behalf.  Since the Center would have 
obtained this recovery, perhaps adjustments would be made to 
these Members’ future obligations to the Center.   
But that is not what happened here.  While the Center 
did institute an ADR in 2000, that ADR was stayed after G-I 
declared bankruptcy.  Ultimately, the Center resolved its own 
claims and claims on behalf of present members of the Center 
in 2009 through a settlement approved by the Bankruptcy 
Court.  As further discussed below, this settlement did not 
include Former Members’ claims – it explicitly stated that the 
settlement covered only the Center’s claims and the claims of 
eight listed “Members,” not including U.S. Gypsum or 
Quigley.  Therefore, the Center’s ADR right under Section 
XIV.4 and the Former Members’ right to bring a breach of 
contract action under Section X do not conflict under the 
events that have transpired here. 
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 We therefore conclude that the Former Members’ right 
to bring a breach of contract action for G-I’s nonpayment 
under Section X does not conflict with “the agreement’s 
overall scheme or plan.”  E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 498 A.2d 
at 1113.  Indeed, reading the Producer Agreement to allow 
such an action when one Member pays another Member’s 
share is the only way to give all of its provisions meaning.  
The way that the courts below read the Producer Agreement 
renders meaningless the third sentence in Section X, writes 
out the qualifying phrase “with respect to asbestos-related 
claims” in Section XIV.1, and turns “may” into “exclusively 
has the authority to” in Section XIV.4.  We eschew their 
reading in favor of one that “gives effect to every term of the 
instrument.”  Council of Dorset Condo. Apartments v. 
Gordon, 801 A.2d 1, 7 (Del. 2002).  We will therefore vacate 
the District Court’s order affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s 
order granting summary judgment to G-I, as the Producer 
Agreement allows Former Members to pursue a breach of 
contract action against G-I. 
B. 
 We will briefly address the argument that the Former 
Members cannot pursue their breach of contract action 
against G-I because their claims are not direct claims, but are 
instead derivative of the Center’s claim.  The District Court 
did not reach this argument, but the Bankruptcy Court did, 
holding in the alternative that even if the Producer Agreement 
did not prevent the Former Members’ claims, they were 
barred due to their derivative nature. 
 Generally, if a cause of action belongs to a 
corporation, only the corporation may bring that action.  
Under some circumstances, a shareholder may bring a 
“derivative” claim on behalf of a corporation for harm done 
to the corporation with recovery going to the corporation.  
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Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, 845 A.2d 1031, 1036 
(Del. 2004).  When a shareholder is injured in a way that 
affects his or her legal rights as a shareholder, however, the 
shareholder retains the right to bring a “direct” claim, with 
recovery going directly to shareholders.  Id.  The Supreme 
Court of Delaware has set forth a standard – the Tooley 
standard – to use in determining whether a shareholder’s 
claim is direct or derivative.  The inquiry “turn[s] solely on 
the following questions:  (1) who suffered the alleged harm 
(the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually); and 
(2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other 
remedy (the corporation or the stockholders, individually)?”  
Id. at 1033. 
 We can see no reason why the direct/derivative inquiry 
should apply in this situation.  Under the case law, the 
distinction applies to claims brought by shareholders in a 
corporation.  See id. (“We set forth in this Opinion the law to 
be applied henceforth in determining whether a stockholder’s 
claim is derivative or direct.”).  G-I and the Former Members 
were not shareholders or investors in the Center, which, as a 
non-profit, non-stock corporation, has no shareholders.  G-I 
has not brought to light any cases bearing any similarity to the 
situation here.  Cases applying the distinction elsewhere in 
corporate and partnership law – such as to limited 
partnerships and LLCs – are inapplicable, as the Center’s 
structure and relationship with its Members is not similar to 
those corporate forms.  See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Tremont Grp. Holdings, Inc., No. 7092, 2012 WL 6632681, 
at *9 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2012) (holding that claims brought 
by partners and investors in a limited partnership were 
derivative where the injury was suffered by the limited 
partnership); Matthew v. Laudamiel, No. 5957, 2012 WL 
605589, at *21 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2012) (holding that claims 
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brought by LLC members were still derivative even after the 
dissolution of the LLC). 
 The Former Members and G-I are in contractual 
privity with one another but not with the Center via the 
Producer Agreement.  It seems illogical to inquire whether 
one contract signatory’s breach of contract claim against 
another signatory is derivative of a non-signatory’s claim.  
While the Center was granted rights under the Producer 
Agreement, this does not make the Former Members’ claims 
derivative.  Once the Former Members were required to make 
additional payments to cover the shortfall in amounts due to 
asbestos plaintiffs caused by G-I’s nonpayment, the Former 
Members suffered damages and had a straightforward breach 
of contract claim. 
 Even if we were to consider whether the Former 
Members’ claims are derivative or direct under the Tooley 
rubric, it is clear that their claims are direct.  As to the first 
question, the Former Members, not the Center, suffered the 
harm caused by G-I’s breach.  The Former Members, and any 
other Members who were required to pay additional amounts 
to cover for G-I’s nonpayment, suffered a harm when they 
paid amounts beyond what was contractually required.  The 
Center, on the other hand, suffered no harm once it required 
the other Members to cover for G-I’s nonpayment and made 
the payments due to asbestos plaintiffs.  As to the second 
question, the Former Members would receive the benefit of 
any recovery in the breach of contract action between two 
signatories to the contract.  The Bankruptcy Court erred in 
concluding that the Former Members’ claims are derivative of 
the Center’s claim, and we conclude that this issue does not 
present a barrier to the Former Members’ actions for breach 
of contract against G-I. 
C. 
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 The Bankruptcy Court further concluded that 
permitting the Former Members to recover on claims that the 
Center had already asserted and resolved under the Settlement 
Agreement would allow “an impermissible double recovery” 
against G-I.  (A-70).  The District Court declined to reach this 
issue.  G-I asserts that it “understood the [Center’s] 
Settlement Agreement to govern all [Center]-related claims, 
and the payment amount was the exclusive source of recovery 
for such claims.”  (G-I Br., at 39).  But such a belief is in 
direct conflict with the explicit terms of both the Order and 
the Settlement Agreement.  We reject G-I’s argument and the 
Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion for several reasons.   
 The Order approving the Settlement Agreement 
between the Center and G-I provided:  “For the avoidance of 
doubt, nothing in this Order or the [Center’s] Settlement 
Agreement shall release, prejudice, compromise or otherwise 
affect the claims, if any, that Former Members . . . have or 
may have against the G-I Plan Parties.”  (A-476).  This 
language clearly reserves the Former Members’ right to bring 
a breach of contract action and suggests that the Settlement 
Agreement did not cover the Former Members’ claims. 
 Indeed, the terms of the Settlement Agreement itself 
show that the Former Members’ claims were not a part of the 
Center’s settlement recovery.  The Settlement Agreement 
provides that the settlement payment that G-I pays to the 
Center represents “G-I’s entire liability to the [Center] for its 
share of liability payments and allocated expenses under the 
terms of the Producer Agreement and Attachment A thereto.”  
(A-428) (emphasis added).  The Settlement Agreement states 
that upon the Center’s receipt of the settlement payment, the 
Center and “the Members” release all claims and causes of 
action that they had or may have against G-I, including claims 
for any alleged breach of the Producer Agreement.  (A-430).  
 27 
The Settlement Agreement defines “Members” as “the 
present members of [the Center],” listing eight companies 
specifically.  (A-423).  The Former Members are not included 
in the eight companies listed as “Members” under the 
Settlement Agreement, nor were they “present members of 
[the Center]” on the date of the Settlement Agreement.     
 The Center had its own claim for damages based upon 
the settlement agreements worth $222 million that were 
voided due to G-I’s breach.  And the Former Members were 
not the only Members of the Center required to pay additional 
sums to cover G-I’s share of asbestos settlements.  To the 
extent that some of these companies are still Members of the 
Center, the Center could bring these claims against G-I on 
their behalf.  Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement 
and the Order approving it, these were the claims that the 
Settlement Agreement resolved, not the Former Members’ 
claims.    
 Further, the issue of “impermissible double recovery” 
goes to apportionment of liability, not to the Former 
Members’ right to bring a cause of action under the Producer 
Agreement.  G-I seems to recognize this point, by arguing 
that the Center’s agreement to indemnify G-I against the 
Former Members’ breach of contract claims, memorialized in 
the Settlement Agreement, has no bearing on the construction 
of the Producer Agreement.  While we maintain that the 
Former Members’ claims were not included in the Settlement 
Agreement, even if they were, this would not affect our 
reading of the Former Members’ ability to bring a breach of 
contract action against G-I, because the terms of a settlement 
agreement to which the Former Members were not parties 
cannot change the construction of the Producer Agreement.  
In conclusion, we are not concerned, as the Bankruptcy Court 
was, that allowing the Former Members to assert breach of 
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contract claims against G-I would lead to an impermissible 
double recovery.  The Center’s recovery for its own claims 
and claims it brought on behalf of present Members of the 
Center have no bearing on the Former Members’ claims, 
particularly when they were explicitly excluded from the 
Settlement Agreement between the Center and G-I. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the District 
Court’s order affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s grant of 
summary judgment in G-I’s favor and remand to the District 
Court.  The District Court should vacate its opinion and 
remand to the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  We have determined that the 
Producer Agreement does not prohibit the Former Members’ 
breach of contract actions against G-I.  The merits of the 
Former Members’ claims – whether G-I breached the 
Producer Agreement, whether they can show damages, and 
whether G-I has any valid defenses – are not before this Court 
and we make no comment on their likelihood of success.  On 
remand, the Bankruptcy Court may allow discovery and 
additional summary judgment motions on the merits of these 
claims or proceed to trial. 
